BRITTENWOODS

Executive Summary

This comprehensive research report presents a rigorous forensic analysis of Jamaica’s political economy, specifically evaluating the financial and structural feasibility of “The Sovereign Pivot.” This strategic roadmap proposes a fundamental paradigm shift from the current model of “Sterilized Stability”—characterized by record foreign exchange (FX) reserves, low growth, and high debt service—to a model of “Productive Sovereignty.” The core hypothesis posits that the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) can optimize its sovereign balance sheet by substituting a portion of its expensive liquid international reserves with “Economic Insurance” (contingent credit lines, parametric risk transfer, and commodity hedging) and redirecting the released capital into “Physical Hedging” infrastructure—specifically, an 80% transition to renewable energy and a 50% import substitution strategy in agriculture.

The analysis corroborates the diagnosis presented in the “Shadow National Accounts,” confirming that Jamaica’s macroeconomic stability is currently subsidized by remittance inflows that mask deep structural insolvencies in the corporate and energy sectors. The “Cost of Carry” on holding US$5.6 billion in reserves—while simultaneously issuing high-interest central bank securities to sterilize the associated liquidity—represents a significant quasi-fiscal burden, estimated at approximately US$75–$90 million annually.[1] Furthermore, the cumulative “Cost of Devaluation” on the public debt stock, estimated at J$345 billion between 2016 and 2025, constitutes a massive transfer of public wealth to external creditors merely to maintain the accounting value of liabilities.¹

The feasibility analysis indicates that “Physical Hedging”—replacing imported fossil fuels with domestic renewable generation—offers the most robust long-term solution to Jamaica’s balance of payments vulnerabilities. By treating renewable energy assets as “Virtual Reserves,” the state can permanently reduce the structural demand for hard currency. However, the transition presents acute risks. Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) heavily weight liquid assets in their methodologies. Converting liquid cash into illiquid infrastructure assets, even if economically rational, risks precipitating a credit downgrade in the short term unless the reduction in import bills is immediate and verifiable.

The report concludes that while the “Sovereign Pivot” is financially viable and economically imperative, the mechanism of replacing liquid reserves with infrastructure requires a phased “Liquidity Bridge.” This involves utilizing multilateral contingent credit facilities (like the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line or Precautionary and Liquidity Line) and parametric insurance to maintain the appearance and function of liquidity while the physical transition lowers the requirement for liquidity. The agricultural pivot faces steeper agronomic and scale challenges than the energy pivot, suggesting a prioritized implementation strategy is required.

Part I: The Structural Diagnosis of “Sterilized Stability”

1.1 The “Shadow National Accounts” and the Treadmill Dynamic

To evaluate the feasibility of the Sovereign Pivot, one must first accept the forensic diagnosis of the “Shadow National Accounts.” This framework argues that standard GDP metrics fail to capture the true economic reality of Jamaica because they measure the volume of activity rather than the retention of value. The period from 1990 to 2025 reveals a “written-down value” of the economy where growth is consistently undermined by the destruction of the domestic currency’s purchasing power and the expatriation of investment income. The economy operates on a “Treadmill Dynamic”: it must generate increasing primary surpluses and attract higher levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) simply to maintain a static external position.

The most insidious component of this dynamic is the “Valuation Effect.” This is effectively a “Shadow Tax” imposed by currency depreciation on the portion of the sovereign debt denominated in foreign currency. In 2016, for example, a depreciation event increased the debt stock by J$68.8 billion without a single cent of new borrowing being deployed for productive use.[1] This accounting adjustment consumes fiscal space that could otherwise fund infrastructure, forcing the government to run primary surpluses not to invest, but merely to chase the receding horizon of its own solvency. The data indicates that between 2016 and 2025, the GOJ absorbed a cumulative J$345 billion in these valuation costs.¹

Parallel to the valuation shock is the hemorrhage of investment income. The analysis identifies a “maturity mismatch” in FDI flows. Investments made in the tourism and telecommunications sectors in the early 2000s have now entered their “harvest phase,” extracting massive liquidity from the domestic market. Data from 2024 suggests a ratio where for every US$1.00 of new FDI inflow, approximately US$3.75 flows out as repatriated profits.¹ This creates a structural insolvency in the corporate sector, where the net capital contribution is negative.

1.2 The Remittance Subsidy: The Hidden Stabilizer

The structural deficit created by energy imports and profit repatriation is plugged by the “Remittance Subsidy.” With remittance inflows covering profit outflows by a factor of nearly 4x, the Jamaican diaspora acts as a “Shadow Sovereign,” subsidizing the convertibility of the Jamaican Dollar for multinational corporations.¹ The Central Bank (BOJ) effectively functions as a clearinghouse, purchasing remittance dollars to build reserves, which are then sold back into the market via the B-FXITT facility to provide liquidity for repatriation. This cycle creates a deceptive stability; the currency is not stabilized by export competitiveness but by the export of labor.

1.3 The Paradox of Prudence: The Cost of Excessive Reserves

By 2025, Jamaica achieved record gross international reserves (GIR) exceeding US$5.6 billion.² While this provides a robust buffer against external shocks, it creates a “Paradox of Prudence.” To accumulate and hold these reserves, the BOJ must purchase USD from the market. To prevent this injection of Jamaican Dollars from causing inflation, the BOJ “sterilizes” the intervention by issuing Certificates of Deposit (CDs).

This sterilization creates a significant “Cost of Carry.” The BOJ pays interest rates of 6.75%–7.00% on these CDs.¹ Conversely, the USD reserves are invested in safe, liquid assets (like US Treasuries) earning approximately 4.0%–4.5%. This negative spread (approx. 250–300 basis points) results in a quasi-fiscal loss. On a sterilized portfolio of US$3 billion, this equates to an annual cost of US$75–$90 million—capital that is essentially burned to maintain the optics of stability.¹

Furthermore, the high interest rates required to maintain this sterilization structure ripple through the economy. Commercial lending rates remain elevated (~12%), crowding out domestic borrowing for the real sector.³ Local manufacturing and agriculture cannot compete with a cost of capital of 12% when competitors in the US or Europe access capital at 4–5%. Thus, the reserve accumulation strategy, while pleasing to bondholders, actively suppresses domestic capital formation.

The Sovereign Pivot proposes breaking this cycle by treating Energy Independence and Food Security not merely as development goals, but as Macro-Prudential FX Risk Management Strategies. By reducing the structural demand for USD (to pay for oil and food), the country can reduce the need for such high levels of reserves, thereby lowering the cost of carry and releasing capital for growth.

Part II: Theoretical Framework – Replacing Reserves with Insurance

The central financial engineering question of the Sovereign Pivot is whether a country can safely reduce its liquid cash reserves (“Self-Insurance”) by substituting them with contingent liabilities and financial instruments (“Market Insurance”).

2.1 The Hierarchy of Sovereign Liquidity

Conventionally, sovereigns hold reserves to smooth consumption during terms-of-trade shocks and to prevent balance of payments crises. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) utilizes the Assessment of Reserve Adequacy (ARA) metric to determine safe levels. However, reserves are the most expensive form of insurance due to the opportunity cost of the capital.⁴

Table 1: Comparative Cost of Sovereign Liquidity Instruments

Instrument	Nature	Availability	Cost Structure	Trigger Condition
Cash Reserves	Self-Insurance	Immediate	High: Opportunity Cost + Sterilization Spread (200-300 bps)	Discretionary
IMF FCL/PLL	Contingent Credit	Immediate	Low: Commitment Fee (~25-60 bps) + Service Charge if drawn 5	BOP Need / Pre-qualification
Catastrophe Bonds	Risk Transfer	Delayed (Weeks)	Medium/High: Risk Premium + Coupon (300-600 bps)	Parametric (e.g., Wind Speed)
Parametric Insurance	Risk Transfer	Fast (Days/Weeks)	High: Premium tends to be 1.2x–3.2x expected loss 6	Parametric Index
Commodity Hedging	Price Lock	Contractual	Variable: Option Premiums (Volatility dependent)	Market Price Movement
Physical Hedging	Asset Substitution	Permanent	Upfront CAPEX (High) vs. Zero Marginal Cost (Low)	N/A (Structural Reduction)

2.2 The Argument for Substitution

Research suggests that for countries with strong institutional frameworks, contingent credit lines (like the IMF’s FCL or PLL) are a superior substitute for holding excessive cash reserves.⁵ The commitment fee for an FCL is significantly lower than the spread paid to sterilize reserves. Accessing a credit line of 450% of quota could save a country like Jamaica up to 0.5% of GDP annually compared to holding equivalent cash reserves.⁵ Furthermore, the announcement of a contingent credit line can lower sovereign spreads (borrowing costs) by signaling strong fundamentals, further reducing the cost of debt.⁵

2.3 The Limitations of Financial Insurance

While financial instruments can replace liquidity, they cannot replace solvency. There is significant “basis risk” associated with parametric insurance and Cat Bonds—the risk that a disaster occurs (e.g., a slow-moving storm causing floods) but does not trigger the specific parameter (e.g., wind speed), resulting in no payout despite economic loss.⁷ Most existing instruments cover natural disasters, while instruments covering economic shocks (e.g., a collapse in tourism demand or a spike in oil prices not linked to a storm) are rarer and more expensive.⁸ Additionally, financial hedges are typically short-term (1-3 years), whereas infrastructure projects (Physical Hedging) are long-term (25-30 years). Replacing permanent reserves with short-term hedges introduces rollover risk.

2.4 The Concept of “Physical Hedging”

The Sovereign Pivot introduces “Physical Hedging” as the ultimate reserve substitute. If Jamaica installs 100MW of solar capacity, it permanently removes the need to import a specific volume of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) for the 25-year life of the plant. The Net Present Value (NPV) of the avoided oil imports can be conceptualized as “Virtual Reserves.” The country no longer needs to hold the cash to buy that oil. Unlike financial hedges, which expire, physical hedges provide permanent immunity to commodity price volatility for the portion of energy replaced.¹

Part III: The Energy Pivot – Operationalizing Physical Hedging

The energy sector represents the largest single source of FX leakage and the most viable target for physical hedging.

3.1 The Fossil Fuel Hemorrhage and Renewable Arbitrage

Jamaica imports approximately US$1.5–$1.8 billion in mineral fuels annually.[1] This expenditure is highly volatile, exposing the entire economy to global geopolitical shocks. The electricity sector, dependent on HFO and Diesel, produces power at rates fluctuating between US$0.30 and US$0.40/kWh, rendering the industrial sector uncompetitive.⁹

However, the technological landscape has shifted dramatically. The Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) for solar PV in the region has fallen to US$0.04–$0.06/kWh, while HFO generation remains at US$0.18–$0.26/kWh (marginal cost).[1, 10] This creates a massive arbitrage opportunity. There is a gross margin of nearly US$0.15–$0.20/kWh between the cost of new renewable generation and the cost of legacy thermal generation. The Sovereign Pivot proposes capturing a portion of this arbitrage. Instead of passing the full savings to the consumer immediately, a “Sovereign Levy” (e.g., US$0.02/kWh) is retained to capitalize the JSRF. Even with this levy, consumer prices would drop significantly (e.g., to US$0.15/kWh), stimulating demand.¹

3.2 Implementation: The 80% Renewable Target and Grid Stability

Transitioning to 80% renewable energy (RE) by 2040 is technically aggressive but feasible with modern storage technologies. The constraint is not generation potential but grid stability. The intermittency of solar and wind requires Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) and synchronous condensers to maintain grid inertia. Without BESS, the grid cannot absorb more than ~20-30% variable RE without instability, as evidenced by blackouts in similar island contexts.¹¹ The cost of the pivot must include massive batteries, raising the “effective LCOE” of renewables, but likely still keeping it below HFO costs.

The grid infrastructure must also be upgraded to “Smart Grid” standards to manage bi-directional flows and distributed generation.¹² This CAPEX is substantial, underscoring the need for the “Liquidity Bridge” discussed in Part V.

3.3 Financial Impact: The Virtual Reserve Effect

Achieving 50% RE by 2030 would reduce fuel imports by approximately US$750 million annually. This reduction in USD demand is structurally equivalent to an increase in supply. The BOJ would need to sell US$750 million less into the market to defend the currency. Consequently, the denominator in the IMF’s “Months of Import Cover” metric decreases. If the annual import bill drops from US$6bn to US$5.25bn, the required reserves drop proportionally. Theoretically, the BOJ could release ~US$500 million in reserves (maintaining ratios) to the JSRF for reinvestment without weakening its external position metrics.¹

Part IV: The Agricultural Pivot – The Limits of Import Substitution

While the energy pivot relies on proven technology and arbitrage, the agricultural pivot (“The Soft Hedge”) faces steeper structural and agronomic challenges.

4.1 The Food Security Deficit and the Feed Trap

Jamaica imports over US$1 billion in food annually. A critical vulnerability is the “Feed Trap”—the importation of US$140 million in corn and soy to support the local poultry industry.¹ This creates a secondary dependency: the local chicken industry is essentially an assembly plant for imported American grain. The Sovereign Pivot targets a 30% substitution of imported feed with local corn and soy, but the feasibility of this is questionable.

4.2 Agronomic Feasibility and Historical Failures

Agronomic data and historical precedent suggest caution regarding large-scale grain cultivation in Jamaica. US corn production benefits from massive scale, subsidies, and mechanization, resulting in prices that are difficult to match in a small island context. Jamaica’s topography is largely mountainous, and competition for flat arable land comes from housing, tourism, and high-value crops.¹⁴ Furthermore, climate change models predict declining maize yields in the tropics due to heat stress and irregular rainfall.¹⁵

Historical attempts, such as the Jamaica Broilers Group pilot in 2013, achieved “acceptable yields” but failed to scale significantly to replace imports, implying thin or negative economic margins compared to importing cheap US grain.¹⁶ Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategies in the Caribbean have historically failed due to lack of comparative advantage and the high cost of inputs.¹⁸

4.3 Strategic Pivot: Agro-Industrial Value Chain and Alternative Feeds

Given these constraints, the report suggests shifting the focus from raw grain production to Value-Added Processing and Alternative Feeds. Re-establishing a crushing plant to process imported raw soybean beans into meal and oil would allow Jamaica to capture the “crush margin” (value add) and produce cooking oil domestically, substituting for imported refined oil.¹ This aligns better with industrial logic than attempting to compete with the US Midwest in growing grain.

Additionally, research by CARDI suggests utilizing cassava or sorghum, which are more drought-tolerant and suitable for Jamaican soils, as partial substitutes for corn in animal feed.¹⁹ Integrating technology through “Agro-Parks” with irrigation and post-harvest facilities is essential to reduce losses and meet the consistency requirements of industrial buyers.²¹ The target of 50% food security is viable only if defined broadly (vegetables, tubers, poultry) rather than replacing bulk grain imports.

Part V: Financial Engineering – The Liquidity Bridge

To move from the current state of high reserves to the future state of low imports, Jamaica must cross a “valley of death” where liquidity is needed to fund the transition before the savings materialize.

5.1 The Jamaica Sovereign Resilience Fund (JSRF)

The JSRF is the vehicle for this transformation. Unlike traditional Sovereign Wealth Funds funded by excess commodity exports (e.g., Norway’s oil fund), the JSRF is capitalized by “Avoided Costs” and “Re-allocated Reserves.” The primary capitalization source is the “Energy Levy”—capturing a portion of the renewable energy savings before they are passed to the consumer. The second, more controversial source, is the drawdown of “excess” BOJ reserves.

5.2 Replacing Reserves with Economic Insurance

To safely draw down reserves without spooking markets or rating agencies, the BOJ must substitute them with “contingent liquidity.”

5.2.1 The IMF Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL)

Jamaica qualified for a PLL in 2023.²² This facility acts as a credit card with a high limit, providing access to IMF resources only if a BOP need arises. The BOJ can argue that US$1 billion in PLL access allows for a US$1 billion reduction in cash reserves. The cost of the PLL (commitment fee) is <50 bps, whereas the cost of holding reserves is ~300 bps (negative carry).⁵ Maximizing access limits under the PLL or transitioning to the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) as institutional strength improves would signal even higher creditworthiness.

5.2.2 Sovereign Parametric Insurance and Economic Shock Triggers

Jamaica currently uses CCRIF for hurricane/earthquake risk. The Sovereign Pivot requires expanding this to Economic Shock Insurance. A parametric policy triggered by a specified drop in tourist arrivals (e.g., >20% drop year-over-year) or flight cancellations would hedge the primary source of FX inflow.²³ Designing the trigger to exclude endogenous factors (like bad service or crime) and focus on exogenous shocks (pandemic, US recession) is technically feasible but expensive, with premiums potentially reaching 5-10% rate-on-line.²⁴ However, this cost may be justified if it enables the release of significantly larger reserve amounts.

5.2.3 The “Hacienda Hedge” Model for Imports

Mexico successfully uses put options to hedge its oil exports. As an importer, Jamaica requires Call Options to protect against price spikes. Uruguay executed a similar oil price hedge with the World Bank in 2016 to protect its budget.²⁵ Jamaica could purchase long-dated Call Options on oil; if prices rise above a strike price (e.g., $80/bbl), the payout offsets the increased import bill, protecting reserves. This stabilizes the FX demand for oil, reducing the volatility that necessitates high reserves.

5.3 Debt Management: Reducing the Valuation Effect

The JSRF should be mandated to aggressively buy back USD-denominated global bonds (JAMAN) in the secondary market using the savings from the energy pivot. Retiring foreign debt reduces the “Valuation Effect” risk. Furthermore, issuing JMD-denominated “Green Bonds” to the diaspora allows the government to fund infrastructure in local currency, shifting FX risk away from the sovereign balance sheet.¹

Part VI: The Credit Rating Agency (CRA) Dilemma

A critical risk to the Sovereign Pivot is the reaction of rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch). Their methodologies heavily penalize the depletion of liquid assets, creating a barrier to converting cash into infrastructure.

6.1 The Liquidity Bias in CRA Methodologies

CRAs prioritize “External Liquidity” ratios. S&P’s “External Assessment” score relies heavily on the ratio of usable reserves to gross external financing needs.²⁶ Moody’s utilizes an “External Vulnerability Indicator” (EVI), where reducing reserves increases the ratio, potentially triggering a downgrade.²⁷ Fitch similarly emphasizes the “Reserve Coverage Ratio”.²⁸

The fundamental problem is that CRAs do not account for “Physical Hedging” (lower future import needs) in their current liquidity ratios. They view cash as king; solar panels cannot be used to pay bond coupons in a crisis, whereas cash can. Therefore, drawing down reserves to build solar plants before the import savings are realized will deteriorate liquidity ratios, leading to a potential downgrade. This would raise borrowing costs, counteracting the benefits of the pivot.

6.2 Navigating the Transition Risk and the “J-Curve”

This creates a “J-Curve” effect where creditworthiness appears to dip before improving. To mitigate this, the GOJ must employ specific strategies:

1. The “Escrow” Approach: Do not spend reserves directly. Instead, pledge a portion of reserves as a guarantee for low-interest multilateral loans (World Bank/IDB) specifically for the infrastructure. This keeps the assets on the balance sheet (encumbered but visible) while securing low-cost funding.
2. Multilateral Endorsement: CRAs increasingly recognize climate resilience efforts if backed by institutions like the IMF (RSF program). Jamaica must frame the pivot explicitly within its IMF RSF program to gain “policy credibility”.²²
3. Contingent Liquidity Inclusion: The government must lobby CRAs to fully include contingent credit lines (PLL/FCL) in their liquidity calculations. While Fitch and S&P give some credit for these, they often discount them compared to cash.²⁹

Part VII: National Cash Flow Analysis (2025–2055)

The Sovereign Pivot document projects a cumulative Free Cash Flow (FCF) of US$39.8 billion by 2055. This figure represents the difference between the “Status Quo” scenario and the “Sovereign Pivot” scenario.

7.1 Scenario Analysis

Scenario A: Status Quo (Sterilized Stability)

• GDP Growth: 1.5% average, constrained by high energy costs.
• FX Outflows: Increasing with global inflation.
• Debt: Vulnerable to periodic devaluation shocks.
• Outcome: Solvency is maintained, but prosperity is elusive. The country remains a “hospital for capital”—safe for investors, poor for citizens.

Scenario B: The Sovereign Pivot

• Energy Savings: Achieving 80% RE by 2040 saves ~$1.2bn/year in fuel imports. This is the most reliable component of the projection.
• Agro-Savings: Achieving 30% feed substitution + oil processing saves ~$62m/year.
• Debt Service Savings: Lower interest rates (due to lower risk profile) save ~$300–$500m/year by 2045.
• Cumulative FCF: The projection of ~$39.8 billion assumes reinvestment of these savings at a positive rate of return (infrastructure multiplier).

Validation: The projection is optimistic but directionally sound if execution is flawless. Even capturing 50% of the projected FCF (US$20 billion) would fundamentally transform the Jamaican economy, moving it from a debt-servicing entity to a capital-accumulating one.

Part VIII: Implementation Risks & Strategic Recommendations

8.1 Critical Implementation Risks

The transition is fraught with risks. Execution Failure is a primary concern; large infrastructure projects in the Caribbean often face delays and cost overruns. The JSRF requires robust, independent governance to prevent political capture. Grid Collapse is a technical risk; rushing the RE transition without adequate storage (BESS) can lead to blackouts, damaging the economy and the vital tourism sector.¹¹ Finally, the “J-Curve” of Reform presents a political risk; the transition involves upfront costs (higher CAPEX) before benefits (lower OPEX) materialize, potentially eroding political will.

8.2 Strategic Recommendations

1. Establish the JSRF with Constitutional Protection: The Jamaica Sovereign Resilience Fund must be firewalled from political interference, similar to the EPOC (Economic Programme Oversight Committee) model. Its mandate should be strictly defined: reinvestment in FX-saving infrastructure and debt retirement.

2. Phased “Liquidity Swap”: Do not draw down reserves immediately. Use the IMF RSF and Green Bonds to fund the initial phase. As energy savings materialize (verifiable reduction in oil imports), then gradually reduce cash reserves, replacing them with the “virtual reserves” of the solar/wind assets.

3. Develop “Economic Shock” Parametric Products: Work with the World Bank and private reinsurers to develop a parametric instrument for Tourism Revenue. A policy that pays out if arrivals drop >20% due to any cause would plug the biggest hole in the Balance of Payments, making the reserve substitution much safer.

4. The Energy Levy: Implement the “Sovereign Levy” on electricity tariffs immediately upon the commissioning of RE plants. Capture the arbitrage to fund the JSRF rather than allowing the full drop in generation costs to pass through to consumption immediately.

5. Agro-Processing Focus: Shift the agricultural pivot focus from “growing corn” (high risk) to “processing food” (medium risk) and “growing tubers/vegetables” (low risk/high comparative advantage). Focus on substituting feed using cassava/sorghum rather than 100% grain replacement.

Conclusion

The “Sovereign Pivot” is not just feasible; it is the only viable path out of the trap of Sterilized Stability. Jamaica has successfully stabilized its books; now it must stabilize its structure. Replacing dead capital (cash reserves) with living capital (energy infrastructure) via a bridge of economic insurance is sophisticated financial engineering. It carries risks, primarily regarding credit ratings and grid stability, but the cost of inaction—perpetual wealth transfer to foreign creditors and energy suppliers—is mathematically certain and far higher. The path to 2055 is paved not with asphalt, but with silicon (solar) and soil (processing), financed by the strategic redeployment of sovereign liquidity.

Works cited

1. The Sovereign Pivot: A Thirty-Year Structural Reconciliation and National Cash Flow Analysis for Jamaica (2025–2055)
2. Jamaica’s International Reserves Hit Record US$6.3b, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://jis.gov.jm/jamaicas-international-reserves-hit-record-us6-3b/
3. Jamaica Foreign Exchange Reserves – Trading Economics, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://tradingeconomics.com/jamaica/foreign-exchange-reserves
4. The Cost of Holding Foreign Exchange Reserves – Growth Lab, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://growthlab.hks.harvard.edu/publications/cost-holding-foreign-exchange-reserves
5. Review of the Flexible Credit Line, The Short Term Liquidity Line and the Precautionary and Liquidity Line, and Proposals for Reform in – IMF eLibrary, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/007/2023/039/article-A001-en.xml
6. Natural Disaster Insurance for Sovereigns: Issues, Challenges and Optimality – International Monetary Fund, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020003-print-pdf.pdf
7. Parametric Insurance For Disaster Response – Financial Protection Forum, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.financialprotectionforum.org/sites/default/files/02.%20Parametric%20Insurance_25May2023.pdf
8. Sovereign Debt Evolution: The Natural Disaster Clause – Cleary Gottlieb, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/emrj-materials/issue-11-spring-2021/article_natural_disaster_clause_v3-pdf.pdf
9. Energy Transition Initiative, Island Energy Snapshot – Jamaica (Fact Sheet), NREL(National Renewable Energy Laboratory), accessed on January 3, 2026, https://docs.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/63945.pdf
10. Jamaica’s Energy System: Built on Secrecy and Failed by Design – Medium, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://medium.com/@kingstonchronicle/jamaicas-energy-system-built-on-secrecy-and-failed-by-design-dd8ae88c9598
11. Storing the sun, stabilising the grid – Jamaica Observer, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/2025/07/11/storing-sun-stabilising-grid/
12. JAMAICA’S $140 Million Feed Import Bill: Private Sector Ready to Act, Government Remains Silent – WiredJa, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://wiredja.com/index.php/op-ed/jamaicas-140-million-feed-import-bill-private-sector-ready-to-act-government-remains-silent
13. Building Resilience in Jamaica’s Farming Communities: Insights From a Climate-Smart Intervention | Case Studies in the Environment | University of California Press, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://online.ucpress.edu/cse/article/7/1/1233811/197495/Building-Resilience-in-Jamaica-s-Farming
14. How corn links Jamaica’s food supply to climate change in the US Midwest | SEI, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.sei.org/features/jamaica-food-supply-climate-change-us-midwest/
15. JBG to Grow Corn on 1700-acre Property – The Poultry Site, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.thepoultrysite.com/news/2013/01/jbg-to-grow-corn-on-1700acre-property
16. Agri minister ‘big up’ Jamaica Broilers corn project, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/2012/11/18/agri-minister-big-up-jamaica-broilers-corn-project/
17. The practicality of regional import substitution as a strategy for sustainable development in the Caribbean – Munich Personal RePEc Archive, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/113129/1/MPRA_paper_113129.pdf
18. Final Draft Agriculture Sector Plan – Vision 2030 Jamaica, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.vision2030.gov.jm/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/12/Microsoft-Word-Vision-2030-Jamaica-Final-Draft-Agriculture-Sector-Plan-%E2%80%A6.pdf
19. Toward Traditional Knowledge Transfer for Resilient Small Farming Systems in the Caribbean, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.cardi.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2017/01/Traditional-Knowledge-for-Resilient-Small-Farming-Systems-in-the-Caribbean-APP-Oct2016.pdf
20. Agribusiness-Sector-Profile.pdf – Agriculture – Do Business Jamaica, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://dobusinessjamaica.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Agribusiness-Sector-Profile.pdf
21. Jamaica: Request for an Arrangement Under the Precautionary Liquidity Line and Request for an Arrangement Under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility-Press Release; Staff Report – International Monetary Fund, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2023/03/07/jamaica-request-for-an-arrangement-under-the-precautionary-liquidity-line-and-request-for-530707
22. Safeguarding Marine Ecosystems and Society – World Bank Documents & Reports, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099020325150023338/Report-1_Protecting%20Paradise_Carribean%20Report_06SEP2024.pdf
23. Swiss Re Corporate Solutions | Comprehensive Guide to Parametric Insurance, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://corporatesolutions.swissre.com/dam/jcr:0cd24f12-ebfb-425a-ab42-0187c241bf4a/2023-01-corso-guide-of-parametric-insurance.pdf
24. Managing Exposure to Oil Price Volatility in Uruguay – The World Bank, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/764671523566970532-0340022018/render/casestudyfinancialproductsUruguay2016OilHedgeCaseStudy.pdf
25. ARCHIVE | Criteria | Governments | Sovereigns: So | S&P Global Ratings, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/sourceId/8950072
26. Moody’s Ratings changes Thailand’s outlook to negative from stable, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://ratings.moodys.com/ratings-news/441991
27. Sovereign Credit Ratings Methodology in: IMF Working Papers Volume 2002 Issue 170 (2002), accessed on January 3, 2026, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/170/article-A001-en.xml

Climate-Resilient Debt Clauses – Finance in Common Summit, accessed on January 3, 2026, https://financeincommon.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/Climate-Resilient-Debt-Clauses-Primer.pdf